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joan macleod heminway*
The Best of Times, the Worst of Times: Securities
Regulation Scholarship and Teaching in the
Global Financial Crisis
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it
was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incre-
dulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the
spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we
had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going
direct the other way—in short, the period was so far like the present period,
that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for
evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.1
As we sit here in the midst of a global financial recession,2 many of us
seemingly are seeing—even experiencing—the worst of times, at least from a finan-
cial point of view. For many in the faculty sector, there are lower or nonexistent
travel budgets, hiring freezes, no raises, and fewer dollars for adjuncts and visiting
instructors.3 Our graduating students are having a tougher time finding employ-
© 2010 Joan MacLeod Heminway.
* Professor, The University of Tennessee College of Law; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1985;
A.B., Brown University, 1982. This essay is an enhanced version of comments I delivered as the moderator of a
roundtable at the University of Maryland School of Law program on “Corporate Governance and Securities
Law Responses to the Financial Crisis” held on April 17, 2009. I owe a huge debt of gratitude to my excellent
research assistant, Alicia Teubert, who assisted mightily in the identification and formatting of supporting
citations for this essay. My work on this essay was funded by a summer research grant from The University of
Tennessee College of Law.
1. Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities 1 (A. B. de Mille ed., Allyn & Bacon 1922) (1859).
2. See Scott Neuman, Stock Slide Persists; Global Financial Summit Set, Nat’l Pub. Radio, Oct. 22, 2008,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=95974598 (quoting British Prime Minister Gordon
Brown referring to the current situation as a “global financial recession”).
3. See, e.g., Maggie Reeb, State Cuts $4.9 Million from College Budget, Flat Hat, Oct. 17, 2008, at 1,
available at http://flathatnews.com/files/pdf/flt_pg01_10-17-08.pdf; Karen Sloan, Law Schools Dealing with
Budget Cuts, Nat’l L.J., Jan. 19, 2009, at 1, 12, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?
id=1202427496279; Elie Mystal, Nationwide Pay Freeze Watch: Welcome Brooklyn Law School Faculty, Above
the Law, Feb. 10, 2009, http://abovethelaw.com/2009/02/nationwide_pay_freeze_watch_we.php.
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The Best of Times, the Worst of Times
ment,4 or if they have found desirable, private-firm jobs, they are being told not to
bother to come to work on their originally scheduled start dates at the firm.5 Many
are not being compensated for these delayed start dates.6 Others, less fortunate yet,
are even having their employment offers rescinded.7 Our friends and family mem-
bers are losing—or have lost—their jobs and the compensation and benefits (in-
cluding health insurance) that those jobs provide.8 The worst of times.
Yet (and not to gloat), like a Phoenix rising from the ashes, those of us who
research, write about, and teach law—especially business law—now have more sali-
ence, more status in the wake of the current economic crisis. We have the opportu-
nity to participate in debates about what went wrong and how to fix it,9 and we are
in the scholarly trenches and in the classroom with others doing the same. We can
help relate the facts, analyze the issues and problems, and forward solutions.10 It is
4. See, e.g., Fred Horlbeck, New Lawyers Must Get Creative with Job Searches in South Carolina, S.C. Law.
Wkly., May 11, 2009, at 1.
5. See, e.g., Martha Neil, Bloody Thursday: Six Major Law Firms Ax Attorneys, A.B.A. J., Feb. 12, 2009,
http://www.abajournal.com/news/bloody_thursday_4_major_law_firms_ax_attorneys_more_layoffs_at_
others/.
6. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, News for Incoming Associates at Kirkland and Sidley Austin (and a New Start
Date Round-up), Above the Law, May 8, 2009, http://abovethelaw.com/2009/05/news_for_incoming_
associates_a.php (listing firms that are delaying associates’ start dates and noting which firms are providing
stipends).
7. Ameet Sachdev, Job Market Rough for New Law School Graduates, Chi. Trib., Mar. 9, 2009, http://
archives.chicagotribune.com/2009/mar/09/business/chi-biz-market-tough-law-school-graduates-march09
(“Law firms have rescinded job offers because of the recession.”).
8. See Edmund Andrews, With Grim Job Loss Figures, No Sign That Worst Is Over, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6,
2009, at B1 (noting that approximately 3.6 million jobs were lost between December 2007 and January 2008);
Press Release, Dept. of Labor, Extended Mass Layoffs in the First Quarter of 2009 (May 12, 2009), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/mslo_05122009.pdf; Rex Nutting, U.S. Unemployment Rate Jumps to
26-Year High of 9.7%, MarketWatch.com, Sept. 4, 2009, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/unemployment-
rate-jumps-to-26-year-high-of-97-2009-09-04; see, e.g., Katie Linebaugh, Slump Spreads to Health Care as
Michigan Loses Car Jobs, Wall St. J., July 13, 2009, at A1 (indicating that a side-effect of the lost jobs in
Michigan is an increase in number of people in the state who are uninsured or on Medicaid).
9. For example, a number of law schools are hosting conferences featuring scholarly and other commen-
tary on the financial crisis and related issues. See, e.g., William Harms, Diverse Group of Scholars Will Address
Economic Crisis and Its ‘Credit-Crunch’, U. Chi. Chron., Apr. 2, 2009, http://chronicle.uchicago.edu/090402/
economic.shtml (providing information on the University of Chicago’s “Conference on the Financial Crisis”);
Erin St. John Kelly, Exploring the Future of Financial Regulation, Feb. 16, 2009, http://www.law.columbia.edu/
media_inquiries/news_events/2009/february2009/acspanel (describing Columbia Law School’s conference enti-
tled “Financial Regulation, Corporate Governance and Securities Litigation: What Does the Future Hold?”);
Marsha Stoutenburg, Responding to the Current Economic Crisis, BYU Law News & Events, Apr. 9, 2009, http:/
/www.law2.byu.edu/news/item.php?num=386 (describing the Brigham Young University Law School’s “Feder-
alist Society Beehive Debate”); Seton Hall Law Review, Securities Regulation and the Global Economic Crisis:
What Does the Future Hold?, http://law.shu.edu/Students/academics/journals/law-review/symposium/index.cfm
(agenda for an upcoming symposium); Posting of Villanova Law Review to Legal Scholarship Network’s Profes-
sional Announcements, http://www.ssrn.com/update/lsn/lsnann/ann09081.html  (June 17, 2009) (announcing
a call for papers for Villanova Law Review’s “Symposium on Regulatory Reform: Genesis, Progress, and
Impact”).
10. See generally Steven M. Davidoff, Gods at War: Shotgun Takeovers, Government by Deal, and
the Private Equity Implosion (2009). See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, A Plan for Addressing the Financial Crisis,
Economist’s Voice, Sept. 2008, Vol. 5, Iss. 5, Art. 6, at 1, available at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1416&context=ev (critiquing the $700 billion bailout and proposing an alternative plan); Steven M.
60 journal of business & technology law
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Joan MacLeod Heminway
perhaps not “the best of times” for corporate and securities law professors, but it
nevertheless is an exciting time to be engaging in business law scholarship and
teaching.
Securities regulation is a particularly relevant area for inquiry and analysis, for
obvious reasons.11 Securities markets around the world have been both players in
and victims of the global financial crisis.12 Each securities market is regulated by
distinct national and regional bodies of standards and principles.13 Each is regu-
lated principally using or building upon national and international institutional
structures and enforcement systems and vehicles.14 Is it time to recast those regula-
tory rules and institutions?15 Is it time for more supranational standards, rules, and
Davidoff & David T. Zaring, Big Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 463
(2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1306342 (reviewing the “deals” struck by the government, the
legal justification for them, and how they will affect legal scholarship); Kenneth Ayotte & David Skeel, Jr.,
Bankruptcy or Bailouts? 33–34 (Univ. of Penn. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 09-11, 2009), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1362639 (suggesting that using bankruptcy as a solution to the economic problems
of companies may be more effective than first thought); Robert C. Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance 7 (Cor-
nell Law Sch. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 53), available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1055&context=clsops_papers (suggesting short and long term fixes to prevent future hous-
ing bubbles).
11. According to Finance Professor Luigi Zingales, “[t]he backbone of U.S. security law was introduced in
the 1930s to restore the public’s trust in securities market [sic] . . . . Seventy-five years later, we face a similar
problem trying to restore trust in securities market [sic] . . . .” Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regula-
tion 2 (Chicago Booth Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 08-27, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1319648; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 Geo. L.J. 193, 198 (2008) (arguing that regulation of
systemic risk is necessary because if left to individuals to self regulate, the tragedy of the commons phenome-
non will occur).
12. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 249 (“[T]he Bank of England and other ‘central banks on both
sides of the Atlantic’ have become ‘actively engaged’ in discussing . . . ‘the feasibility of mass purchases of
mortgage-backed securities as a possible solution to the credit crisis.’ ” (citing Chris Giles & Krishna Guha,
Mortgage Crisis Talks Under Way, Fin. Times (London), Mar. 22, 2008, at 1)). At the April 2, 2009 meeting of
the G-20, the G-20 leaders stated, “[w]e face the greatest challenge to the world economy in modern times; a
crisis which has deepened since we last met, which affects the lives of women, men, and children in every
country, and which all countries must join together to resolve. A global crisis requires a global solution.” G-20
Leaders Statement, The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform ¶ 2 (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://
www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf.
13. See, e.g., International Organization of Securities Commissions, Ordinary Members of IOSCO, http://
www.iosco.org/lists/display_members.cfm (last visited Sept. 11, 2009) (listing various national securities com-
missions, regulatory bodies, and national exchanges).
14. See generally Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, Is There a Uniform EU Securities Law After the Financial
Services Action Plan?, 14 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 43 (2008) (describing European Community and European
nation state securities regulation); Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of
Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. Corp. L. 865, 938 (2008) (“In the international arena,
cooperation among regulators has evolved from bilateral agreements to multilateral agreements in the form of
participation in international organizations.”); Ana Carvajal & Jennifer Elliott, Strengths and Weaknesses in
Securities Market Regulation: A Global Analysis (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 07/259, 2007), availa-
ble at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07259.pdf (describing and assessing national securities
market regulation). The International Organization of Securities Commissions provides helpful international
coordination. See General Information on IOSCO: The International Organization of Securities Commissions,
http://www.iosco.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2009).
15. The G-20 leaders think so. In its April 2, 2009 Leaders Statement, the G-20 said:
vol. 5 no. 1 2010 61
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structures in securities regulation?16 Are existing international bodies the right in-
stitutions through which changes should be suggested, vetted, and made?17 What
do the processes regarding the construction of, and the efforts to obtain multilat-
eral buy-in for, the International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) tell us
(and not tell us) about ways to approach (and not approach) standardization in
securities regulation across regional and national borders?18 Certainly, the current
environment speaks to the need for regulatory coordination, domestically and
internationally.19
More questions abound, especially as to the capacity of our system to propose
and manage lasting, positive change. Are our regulators up to the task?20 What can
Major failures in the financial sector and in financial regulation and supervision were fundamental
causes of the crisis. Confidence will not be restored until we rebuild trust in our financial system. We
will take action to build a stronger, more globally consistent, supervisory and regulatory framework
for the future financial sector, which will support sustainable global growth and serve the needs of
business and citizens.
G-20 Leaders Statement, supra note 12, at ¶ 13.
16. The Securities Law Subcommittee of the International Bar Association argues that “international se-
curities regulation, interpretation and enforcement . . . should evolve by synchronising [sic] the existing na-
tional and regional regulations [through convergence or standardization, exemption, and recognition].”
Securities Law Committee, Final Report of the Securities Law Subcommittee of the Task Force on Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction of the International Bar Association, 2009 Global Capital Mkts. & U.S. Sec. L. 265, 279, available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1109061. Yet most believe that international cooperation on better securities regu-
lation will not be easy. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, U.S. Securities Regulation and Global Competition, 3 Va.
L. & Bus. Rev. 191, 204 (2008) (noting that the “diffused global market” in which “no nation is able to capture
enough of the benefits from investments in quality regulation” is a “classic free rider problem”).
17. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 Yale J. Int’l L.
113, 150 (2009) (“IOSCO has been successful in coordinating mutual assistance in securities law enforcement
among regulators in developed countries . . . . [but, offshore financial centers] have incentives to renege, and it
is doubtful that sustained compliance can be achieved through [transnational regulatory networks like
IOSCO].”).
18. Arguably, it is too soon to tell. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The SEC’s Global Accounting
Vision: A Realistic Appraisal of a Quixotic Quest, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1 (2008) (describing and critiquing the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s adoption of IFRS); Andreas M. Fleckner, FASB and IASB: Dependence
Despite Independence, 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 275 (2008) (comparing and contrasting the Financial Accounting
Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board). See also Langevoort, supra note 16, at
200–02 (describing briefly the then-current state of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s rulemaking
regarding IFRS and characterizing the Securities and Exchange Commission’s decisions using the framework
described in Fleckner’s article).
19. According to Professor Steven Schwarcz, with “finance and markets being global, systemic collapse in
one country can affect markets and institutions in other countries.”  Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 198. Even in
2004, the International Monetary Fund noted that “[c]onsideration could be given to establishing and main-
taining regular contacts with the most relevant authorities and making a joint effort to understand each others’
systems, while working towards an international arrangement or an institutional mechanism for improving
domestic and international regulatory coordination and exchange of information.” Int’l Monetary Fund,
Financial Sector Regulation: Issues & Gaps 32 (2004), available at http://imf.org/external/np/mfd/2004/
eng/080404.pdf. But cf. Verdier, supra note 17, at 130–31 (arguing that transnational regulatory networks,
including IOSCO, have limitations not discussed in other academic discourse).
20. In an earlier article, I wrote:
The SEC’s rulemaking expertise generally is acknowledged to extend only to the boundaries of its
mandate under the federal securities laws. The breadth and depth of this expertise reflects the knowl-
edge and experience of the SEC commissioners and staff. Moreover, recognition of, and deference to,
62 journal of business & technology law
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Joan MacLeod Heminway
they regulate, and what is beyond their capacity for regulation?21 These two broad
questions raise a host of others. For example, one might ask whether our regulators
are smart enough or skilled enough.22 Is effective regulation possible in a constantly
evolving, innovative, entrepreneurial market?23 Can our regulators effectively in-
crease derivatives regulation?24 What about the regulation of hedge funds?25 Is it
the SEC’s expertise is shaped by judicial jurisdiction and structural competence considerations.
Courts and the President have noted the SEC’s expertise in interpreting the statutes that it
administers.
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for Federal Corporate Governance
Initiatives, 10 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 225, 286 (2005). That was then, and this is now. Most commenta-
tors now doubt the Securities and Exchange Commission’s capacity to regulate in the current environment, for
one reason or another. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 Va. L. Rev. 785, 811
(2009) (“Some commentators have attributed the SEC’s regulatory failures to the unwillingness of SEC staff to
be sufficiently vigilant in dealings with ‘prominent Wall Street insiders.’ Others blame demoralization of the
staff of an agency that is more concerned with deregulation than with active oversight.”); Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I.
Finds Financier Suspected of Fraud, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 2009, at B1 (“The Stanford case, like the case of
Bernard L. Madoff and his purported $50 billion Ponzi scheme, has raised fresh questions about the ability of
the S.E.C. to police and regulate the securities industry.”).
21. See, e.g., Susan Schott Karr, Keeping Pace, Working Smart: Is the SEC Overextended?, Compliance Wk.,
Aug. 3, 2004, https://www.complianceweek.com/article/1005/keeping-pace-working-smart-is-the-sec-over
extended (assessing the Securities and Exchange Commission’s capacity to fulfill its mandate); see also infra
notes 22–29 and accompanying text.
22. Possibly not. See, e.g., Sara Hansard, Lack of SEC Enforcement Called Culprit in Lax Oversight, Invest-
ment News, Mar. 8, 2009, at 10 (“Scandals in the financial markets over the past several years are the result of
enforcement failures and a lack of regulators with industry-specific knowledge, not a need for increased regula-
tion.”); Cristina McEachern, Markopolos: SEC a Group of Chickens Tasked with Catching Foxes, Advanced
Trading, Feb. 6, 2009, http://www.advancedtrading.com/regulations/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=213300370#
undefined (reporting on congressional testimony regarding—among other things—the substantive compe-
tence of the Securities and Exchange Commission).
23. See generally Olivier J. Blanchard, The Crisis: Basic Mechanisms, and Appropriate Policies 29 (Mass. Inst.
of Tech. Dept. of Econ., Working Paper No. 09-01, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1324280 (“Even
if and when new regulation is introduced and tax laws are changed, we should be under no illusion that
systemic risk will be fully under control. Regulation will be imperfect at best, and always lag behind financial
innovation.”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets 6 (Duke Law Sch. Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Paper No. 217, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1240863 (“Prescriptive regulation can
begin to address existing market failures, but financial markets evolve so rapidly and often in such unexpected
ways that prescriptive regulation can never address all potential failures.”); Andrew W. Lo, Regulatory Reform
in the Wake of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008, at 4 (Mar. 10, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1398207) (“The complexity of financial markets is straining the capacity of regulators to keep up
with its innovations, many of which were not contemplated when the existing regulatory bodies were first
formed.”).
24. They should. See Fisch, supra note 20, at 807–08 (noting that derivatives regulation is “perhaps the
most critical accounting issue of the credit crisis” and that “[d]espite the enormous risks posed by derivatives[,]
. . . the SEC yielded to industry and political claims that derivatives trading did not require regulatory over-
sight”). In 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission did create a rule requiring the disclosure of “the risks
associated with their derivatives positions,” but this did not prevent the crisis. Id. at 809–10; see also Thomas
Lee Hazen, Filling a Regulatory Gap: It Is Time to Regulate Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 13 N.C. Banking Inst.
123, 123 (2009) (equating credit default swap derivatives with gambling and suggesting the use of insurance
regulation as a guide to regulating derivatives). President Obama’s financial regulatory reform plan calls for the
“[c]omprehensive regulation of all over-the-counter derivatives.” U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Financial
Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation 3, available at http://financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_
web.pdf [hereinafter Financial Regulatory Reform].
vol. 5 no. 1 2010 63
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possible to regulate systemic risk?26 Can our regulators successfully regulate lever-
age?27 Is it time to further regulate credit rating agencies?28 Can the Securities and
Securities and Exchange Commission expertise in regulating complex derivatives may be in doubt, how-
ever. See Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and
Mission, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 975, 999 (suggesting that the Securities and Exchange Commission may not be
able to regulate complex derivatives).
25. The European Union has proposed the following:
[To regulate] managers of alternative investment funds such as hedge funds and private equity groups
in order to limit the systemic risk such funds pose to the European Union’s financial markets . . . [by
requiring that] the managers of all hedge funds and other alternative capital pools worth more than
EUR100 million (U.S. $133 million) . . . have to report regularly on their main investments, perform-
ance, and risks.
Commission Proposes Directive to Regulate Hedge Funds, Private Equity, World Sec. L. Rep. (BNA) ¶ 1–2 (May 1,
2009). Senators Grassley and Levin have introduced the Hedge Fund Transparency Act of 2009. See S. 344,
111th Cong. (2009). This bill will “give the SEC the authority to regulate all pooled investment vehicles, includ-
ing hedge funds, which manage at least $50 million in assets as investment companies.”  Roberta S. Karmel,
The Future of the Securities and Exchange Commission as a Market Regulator 41 (Brooklyn Law Sch., Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 152, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407576. President Obama’s plan
for financial regulatory reform proposes “[t]he registration of advisers of hedge funds and other private pools
of capital with the SEC.” Financial Regulatory Reform, supra note 24, at 3.
26. Before systemic risk can be regulated, we must agree on what it is. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 11, at
196 (noting the confusion that exists regarding which risks are systemic). Systemic risk can be defined as:
[T]he risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic
or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant
losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its
availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility.
Id. at 204. Professor Schwarcz continues:
Without regulation, the externalities caused by systemic risk would not be prevented or internalized
because the motivation of market participants “is to protect themselves but not the system as a whole
. . . . No firm . . . has an incentive to limit its risk taking in order to reduce the danger of contagion
for other firms.”
Id. at 206 (citing President’s Working Group on Fin. Mkts., Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons
of Long Term Capital Management 31 (1999)). Thus, Professor Schwarcz concludes, “regulation of systemic
risk appears not only appropriate, but necessary.” Id. He identifies several possible approaches to regulating
systemic risk in the following categories: (1) “Averting Panics;” (2) “Disclosure;” (3) “Financial-Exposure Lim-
its;” (4) “Reducing Leverage;” (5) “Ensuring Liquidity;” (6) “Ad Hoc Approaches;” and (7) “Market Discipline.”
Id. at 214–34. Another commentator identifies two significant challenges to controlling systemic risk.
Blanchard, supra note 23, at 30. “The first is about monitoring [the regulatory system] itself, what information
to collect, and how to use it to construct measures of systemic risk, both at the national and international
level. . . . The second challenge is how to react when measures of systemic risk increase.” Id. Both securities
and monetary system regulators would play a leading role in regulating systemic risk. President Obama’s plan
calls for the creation of a Financial Services Oversight Council (chaired by the Department of the Treasury and
including the heads of the key federal financial regulators) as members to operate in this area. Financial
Regulatory Reform, supra note 24, at 3.
27. In the last few years, before the onset of the current financial crisis, the Securities and Exchange
Commission was in the business of deregulating leverage in the nation’s key investment banks. See Stephen
Labaton, Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile up New Debt, and Risk, N.Y Times, Oct. 3, 2008, at A1. As a result,
“[l]everage of the financial system as a whole was almost surely too high before the crisis. Regulation can force
lower leverage. This requires however increasing the perimeter of regulation beyond banks to many other
financial institutions.” Blanchard, supra note 23, at 29.
28. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s regulatory implementation of the Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act does “not meet all of the political and market needs contemplated by the CRA Reform Act, as a
number of ideas proposed by the SEC . . . were left hanging, and have been re-proposed.” Karmel, supra note
25, at 43–44; see also Do the SEC’s New Rating Agency Rules Have Any Bite?, Knowledge@Wharton, Dec. 10,
64 journal of business & technology law
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Exchange Commission (“SEC”) effectively and comprehensively enforce the pre-
scriptions and proscriptions within its mandate?29 Should the SEC be combined (in
whole or in part) with the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”)?30
It also will be important to determine the role that the investing public should
play in casting and recasting regulation. SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar re-
cently noted his views on this issue.
[A]s we seek to improve our regulatory process and adopt better rules, I think it
is important to provide retail investors with an active voice in our policymak-
ing. In a recent speech to members of the Investment Company Institute, I
called for the establishment of an advisory committee consisting primarily of
retail investors to provide advice and guidance to the SEC. I strongly believe
direct retail investor input would be helpful toward restoring the confidence of
retail investors in the SEC. It’ll send a powerful message to investors that the
SEC is their advocate.31
2008, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2112. President Obama’s financial reform
plan urges further Securities and Exchange Commission regulation of credit rating agencies. See Washington
Wire, Obama’s Financial Reform Plan: The Condensed Version (June 17, 2009, 24:14 EST), http://blogs.wsj.
com/washwire/2009/06/17/obamas-financial-reform-plan-the-condensed-version/.
29. See generally Fisch, supra note 20, at 788 (“The failures in financial regulation cannot be passed off as
the result of a ‘balkanized system.’ If the SEC has failed, it is not because of regulatory gaps, global competition,
or the convergence of financial service providers, but a lack of functional effectiveness.”); Norman S. Poser,
Why the SEC Failed: Regulators Against Regulation 29 (Brooklyn Law Sch., Legal Studies Paper No. 132, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1348612 (“It appears that, far from monitoring the securities markets and
securities industry in order to detect and terminate abusive and illegal practices, the SEC was prompted into
action only after investigative financial reporters or state regulators had unearthed them.”). SEC enforcement
efforts have been under increasing scrutiny since the onset of the financial crisis, and reforms are already being
implemented. See Melissa Klein Aguilar, Enforcement Under the New SEC Regime, Compliance Wk., Feb. 24,
2009, http://www.complianceweek.com/article/5284/enforcement-under-the-new-sec-regime.
30. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The New Federal Corporation Law?, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 685, 700–01
(2009) (noting and describing the Department of the Treasury’s proposal in this regard, nicknamed the Trea-
sury Blueprint); Karmel, supra note 25, at 44. (“In the view of the author, consolidation of the SEC and the
CFTC would lead to better regulation of the markets . . . .”); Markham & Harty, supra note 14, at 938–39
(outlining steps toward a combination of the SEC and CFTC). President Obama’s plan calls for harmonization
of the regulatory structures between the two agencies, but stops short of proposing a full combination. Finan-
cial Regulatory Reform, supra note 24, at 4 (“The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) would maintain their current responsibilities and authorities as
market regulators, though we propose to harmonize the statutory and regulatory frameworks for futures and
securities.”).
31. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Increasing Accountability and Transparency to Inves-
tors, Remarks at “The SEC Speaks in 2009” (Feb. 6, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/2009/spch020609laa.htm). Commissioner Aguilar’s point, raised again in a June 2009 presentation at
the Compliance Week Annual Conference, is “that the regulatory discussion is not being properly oriented.
There is a need to shift the dialogue from the discussion of how best to preserve financial institutions to what is
best for investors.” Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Reversing Course—Putting Investors First
in Regulatory Reform at “Compliance Week Annual Conference” (June 3, 2009) (transcript available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch060309laa.htm) [hereinafter Reversing Course]. Of course, retail (as op-
posed to institutional) investors hold of record a small percentage of the securities traded in public markets. See
generally Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1105, 1105 (2009) (“The Ameri-
can retail investor is dying. In 1950, retail investors owned over 90% of the stock of U.S. corporations. Today,
vol. 5 no. 1 2010 65
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Possibilities for investor participation in regulation need to be explored. Both Wall
Street and Main Street had roles in the creation of the financial crisis, and both are
suffering its effects.32 Only with participation by both groups will any positive
change hold the promise of being both pervasive and lasting.
A separate set of questions relate to the need for reforms in market regulation. Is
new regulation necessary?33 Do our existing substantive laws and regulation work as
well as anything can?34 Do we need more regulation, or can the market provide
adequate checks?35 Was the crisis created or fueled by a lack of adequate regulation36
retail investors own less than 30% and represent a very small percentage of U.S. trading volume.” (footnotes
omitted)). But the indirect participation of retail investors in public trading markets looms larger and has
resulted in a crisis of confidence.
Investors around the country are feeling the pain of this economic crisis—in their retirement nest
eggs, their college savings plans and in their brokerage accounts. Any credible effort at regulatory
reform has to work for investors, so that they can feel confident in our markets. My objective is to
ensure that prioritizing investors is the primary goal of any regulatory reform.
Reversing Course, supra. A component piece of Commissioner Aguilar’s vision is the increased regulation of
broker-dealers who provide investment advisory services. Id.
32. See Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C.
Banking Inst. 5 (2009); Ralph Z. Hallow & S.A. Miller, Main Street Gets Share of Wall Street Blame, Wash.
Times, Oct. 5, 2008, at A1; Markos Kaminis, Don’t Blame Wall Street—At Least Not Completely, Seeking
Alpha, Sept. 29, 2008, http://seekingalpha.com/article/97879-dont-blame-wall-street-at-least-not-completely.
33. Yes. See Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three of Four Approaches to Financial Regula-
tion: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (forthcoming) (man-
uscript at 1, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1399204) (“First the financial markets collapsed, and second came
massive government intervention designed to address the collapse. The third part of any financial crisis is
reform.”); Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 248 (“A threshold question is whether regulatory measures are appropri-
ate. The Article argues they are because, like a tragedy of the commons, market participants have insufficient
incentives, absent regulation, to limit risk-taking in order to reduce the systemic danger to others.”). Professors
Cunningham and Zaring, however, caution that “[i]n considering what reform should look like, we caution
that the headlong rush to do something should not neglect the surprisingly good things about the old system
or ignore the considerable reform that has already been achieved by the federal government’s massive and
unorthodox response to crisis.” Cunningham & Zaring, supra, at 1; see also Fisch, supra note 20, at 787 (“Mar-
ket crises invariably lead to regulatory reform. Indeed, the SEC owes its existence to the stock market crash of
1929 and the subsequent Great Depression.”). But see Lo, supra note 23, at 2 (“Financial markets do not need
more regulation; they need smarter and more effective regulation.”).
34. No. “During the past decade, the SEC made important regulatory changes [deregulation] that weak-
ened the regulatory system and turned out to be a disaster for investors, significantly contributing to the 2008
financial crisis.”  Poser, supra note 29, at 10. Additionally, “[t]he growth of new financial products that do not
easily fit within the regulatory framework and risk analysis applicable to traditional securities, commodities,
and insurance policies expands these gaps [in the regulatory system].” Fisch, supra note 20, at 787.
35. Many argue it was the era of deregulation that precipitated the crisis. See Hershey H. Friedman &
Linda W. Friedman, The Global Financial Crisis of 2008: What Went Wrong? 3 (Mar. 9, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1356193) (stating that Alan Greenspan’s call “ ‘for less burdensome de-
rivatives regulation, . . . [because the] banks could police themselves’” was wrong). Most commentators in fact
assume that more regulation is needed and offer suggestions. See Fisch, supra note 20, at 823 (“[A]lthough the
precise form of regulatory reform is not critical, the reform efforts must emphasize transparency and enforce-
ment.”); see also Lo, supra note 23, at 2 (“With sufficient transparency and knowledge, many of the problems
posed by financial excess can be solved by market forces . . . , and such solutions are often more efficient and
more effective than government intervention. Facilitating access to information and education should be one of
the two primary objectives of regulation.”).
36. Some scholars argue that the problem was self-interest combined with a lack of regulation. See Moran,
supra note 32, at 94 (“Our financial system was undermined not only by greed and other bad behavior, but by
66 journal of business & technology law
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or human nature?37 What are the limits, in particular, of disclosure regulation as a
vehicle for protecting investors and markets?38 Do we need more substantive
regulation?39
For example, my own world of scholarship and teaching focuses significantly on
securities fraud (including insider trading regulation) under Section 10(b)40 of, and
Rule 10b-541 under, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.42 Dislocations
an utter lack of checks and balances to curb such destructive forces.”); Friedman & Friedman, supra note 35, at
7 (“[The crisis] shows quite clearly what happens when everyone is solely concerned with self-interest. Closely
tied to the concept of pursuit of self interest[sic] is the belief that free markets do not need regulation. Many
economists and CEOs promoted the belief that capitalism could only work well with very little regulation.”).
37. Andrew Lo points out how human nature exacerbates the problem.
[H]uman behavior . . . is driven not by logic and rationality, but by emotion. For example, fear and
greed are among the most powerful of human emotions, and the deep roots of most financial calami-
ties can be traced to these twin forces—greed, which inflates asset bubbles to unsustainable levels,
and the fear that ultimately causes the bubble to burst via panic selling.
Lo, supra note 23, at 2–3. He also notes that:
[T]here is mounting evidence from cognitive neuroscientists that financial gain affects the same
“pleasure centers” of the brain that are activated by certain narcotics. This suggests that prolonged
periods of economic growth and prosperity can induce a collective sense of euphoria and compla-
cency among investors that is not unlike the drug-induced stupor of a cocaine addict.
Id. at 17 (footnote omitted).
38. Professor Steven Schwarcz believes that “[t]he complexity of structured transactions undermines the
long-held disclosure paradigm.”  Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complex-
ity, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 36; see also Emilios Avgouleas, What Future for Disclosures as a Regulatory Tech-
nique? Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis and Beyond 4 (Mar. 26, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, http:/
/ssrn.com/abstract=1369004) (arguing that while disclosure is helpful, its efficacy as a regulatory tool is limited
by the ability of people to understand what is disclosed).
39. Scholars wrestle with this issue in a variety of contexts. For example, in an earlier article, I note
generally that “alternatives or supplements to disclosure regulation involve the substantive regulation of issuers
or investors and enhancements in fraud protection, protection against deception and manipulation that does
not rely solely on the accurate and complete public disclosure of available material information.” Joan Mac-
Leod Heminway, Female Investors and Securities Fraud: Is the Reasonable Investor a Woman?, 15 Wm. & Mary J.
Women & L. 291, 331 (2009); see also Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure
Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 48 Baylor L. Rev. 139, 194 (2006)
(“Securities regulation that is substantive and that prohibits improper behavior can help revive investor trust.”).
Professor Steven Schwarcz proposes that:
[G]overnment regulation should require management to be free of any material conflicts of interest
in disclosure-impaired transactions. . . . The rationale for this rule is that, in the face of complexity,
investors must rely not only on disclosure, but also on the business judgment of management in
setting up complex transactions for the company’s benefit. To that end, the law similarly should focus
on, in addition to disclosure, requiring management to be free of conflicts of interest that would
affect management’s judgment in those transactions.
Schwarcz, supra note 38, at 35–37. In relation to the current financial crisis, Roberta Karmel offers that there R
are “areas where the SEC, or a combined SEC and CFTC, or some new regulator, should focus with respect to
market regulation. These areas are broker-dealer capital adequacy, credit and other OTC derivatives trading,
short sales, hedge funds and credit rating agencies (‘CRAs’).”  Karmel, supra note 25, at 8. Most scholars, R
however, are not advocating comprehensive substantive changes. See Cunningham & Zaring, supra note 33, at 7 R
(“[O]ur conclusion [is that] incremental regulatory adjustments rather than sweeping regulatory revolution are
both superior and more practicable.”).
40. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
41. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
42. See, e.g., Heminway, supra note 39, at 291 (suggesting that the behavior of women investors more R
accurately satisfies the concept of the “reasonable investor” applied under Rule 10b-5 than the behavior of male
vol. 5 no. 1 2010 67
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in financial markets tend to both spawn and expose financial fraud and self-deal-
ing.43 The interconnectedness of national securities markets44 in this environment
raises comparative law issues.45 Even though the U.S. model for securities regula-
tion has been adopted in many countries around the world46 (resulting in a conver-
gence of overall regulatory concepts), there are important differences in the
substance of that regulation and the supervisory bodies that interpret and enforce
that regulation around the world.47 Perhaps what we have learned is that genera-
investors); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Hell Hath No Fury Like an Investor Scorned: Retribution, Deterrence, Res-
toration, and the Criminalization of Securities Fraud Under Rule 10b-5, 2 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 3, 4 (2007) (arguing
that enforcement of criminal securities fraud law is an ineffective deterrent and should instead focus on vic-
tims’ rights and restorative justice); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha Stewart Saved! Insider Violations of Rule
10b-5 for Misrepresented or Undisclosed Personal Facts, 65 Md. L. Rev. 380, 382, 432 (2006) (applying the
elements of securities fraud to the facts of the Stewart case and arguing that it represents a change in the
treatment of key corporate executives); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider
Trading: A Call for Action, 52 Am. U. L. Rev. 1131, 1134 (2003) (arguing for greater clarity in insider trading
regulation as a means to efficiently prosecute violators more effectively).
43. “Currently, [the FBI is] investigating more than 580 corporate fraud cases. And [the FBI has] more
than 1,300 securities fraud cases, including the many Ponzi schemes so prevalent in the news today—from
high-profile financiers such as Bernie Madoff to seemingly ordinary individuals from Arizona, Arkansas, Mas-
sachusetts, or even Minnesota.”  Robert S. Mueller, III, Dir., FBI, Address to the Economic Club of New York
(June 2, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/mueller060209.htm). An earlier ar-
ticle notes that “U.S. Attorneys . . . are investigating whether Lehman was telling investors that its financial
condition was sound at the same time its executives knew the balance sheet was crumbling.”  Noeleen G.
Walder, White-Collar Defense Lawyers Predict a Rash of Criminal Prosecutions over Financial Crisis, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 9, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202425138326. “In June, two former Bear
Stearns hedge-fund managers were indicted in New York’s Eastern District for allegedly misleading clients
about the risk of certain investments.” Id. Additionally “the FBI ha[s] launched a probe into Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, AIG and Lehman.” Id.
44. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for a 75-Year-Old SEC, 95
Va. L. Rev. 941, 943 (“[B]y far the largest shift is the combination of the ubiquity of the Internet and the
convention that trading and offerings are global so that markets are increasingly seamless.”).
45. Many scholars write on these comparative issues. See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, Super-Regulator: A
Comparative Analysis of Securities and Derivatives Regulation in the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, 28
Brook. J. Int’l L. 319, 319 (2003) (“The Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom (“FSA-UK”) and
the Financial Services Agency in Japan (“FSA-Japan”) are two agencies of recent vintage with a unified regula-
tory structure that should provide a basis of comparison with the competitive regulatory approaches of the
U.S.”); John C. Coffee Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 229, 255–84
(2007) (discussing the different enforcement systems used by securities regulators in common and civil law
countries).
46. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 44, at 943 (“[R]ival markets are converging toward the American reporting R
and operational practices.”); Eric A. Posner, International Law and the Disaggregated State, 32 Fla. St. U. L.
Rev. 797, 838 (2005) (“[T]he U.S. SEC has persuaded other countries to adopt U.S. securities policies, making
it easier for the SEC to enforce American securities law and policy overseas.”); Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley:
The Evidence Regarding the Impact of Sox 404, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 703, 757 (2007) (“European and Asian
nations have all adopted many important aspects of U.S.-style securities regulation over the last fifteen years.”).
47.  See Eric Engle, The EU Means Business: A Survey of Legal Challenges and Opportunities in the New
Europe, 4 DePaul Bus. & Com. L.J. 351, 358 (2006) (“The ends of EU securities law look similar to those seen
in U.S. securities law, however, the means used to attain those ends are at times different.”); Cheryl Nichols,
The Importance of Selective Federal Preemption in the U.S. Securities Regulatory Framework: A Lesson from Ca-
nada, Our Neighbor to the North, 10 Chap. L. Rev. 391, 496 (2006) (“The U.S. and Canada are quite similar in
their approaches to the framework for securities regulation; the primary difference is that the U.S. has a single
federal regulatory authority, the Commission, to guide policy and to ensure consistency both domestically and
68 journal of business & technology law
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lized convergence is a necessary but insufficient component of effective market reg-
ulation in global markets.48 These and other observations about securities
regulation in the context of the current global financial crisis have helped push me
further along in some comparative doctrinal work on insider trading that I started
a few years ago.49 Suffice it to say that, under existing national insider trading regu-
lation schemes, one country’s insider trader may be another country’s savvy
investor.50
In this increasingly global environment, it is important that law scholars and
teachers emphasize the need for international legal education51 and that they indi-
vidually and collectively reach out to and interact with their counterparts in other
parts of the world.52 It is also important that we interact with students in other
in the global securities marketplace.”). In March 2009, U.S. Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner advocated collab-
oration on a global framework for reform. See James Quinn, G20 Summit: Timothy Geithner Calls for Global
Regulation, Telegraph.co.uk, Mar. 26, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/g20-summit/
5057267/G20-summit-Timothy-Geithner-calls-for-global-regulation.html. These sentiments were echoed and
extended on the eve of the Pittsburgh summit in September. Rebecca Christie, Geithner Sees G-20 Consensus,
Supports Dollar’s Reserve Role, Bloomberg.com, Sept. 25, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087&sid=aOdHXNfRMHZE; G20 Focuses on Regulation; Geithner Sees Shared Commitment, Wall
Street & Tech., Sept. 24, 2009, http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/regulatory-compliance/showArticle.jhtml?
articleID=220200191.
48. See Eric J. Pan, The New Internationalization of U.S. Securities Regulation: Improving the Prospects for a
Trans-Atlantic Marketplace 2–3 (Cardozo Sch. of Law Jacob Burns Inst. for Adv. Legal Studies Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 217, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1089491 (noting that a decrease in the United
States’ preeminence as a market has led the SEC to propose and adopt policies of “convergence, harmonization
and mutual recognition”). But see Cox, supra note 44, at 943 (“[The] differences between U.S. and foreign R
regimes are slight so that true convergence between them is not necessary to assure investor protection.”).
49. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Common Roots, Divergent Evolution: Insider Trading Doctrine in the
United States, Japan, and Germany (Mar. 23, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
50. See id. at 21 (noting that neither “tippers” nor “misappropriators” are regulated under Japanese law
(citing Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Insider Trading Prohibitions, 15 Transnat’l Law. 63, 84–86
(2002))); see also Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corpo-
rate Governance Systems, 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 147, 160–61 (2001) (“[C]ulture is often invoked as a reason for
differences between various national regimes of insider trading regulation. . . . [For example, in] Japan and
Germany, insider trading has been tolerated for a long time as ‘part of the game’ of securities trading and has
not even carried a stigma of being immoral.”).
51. See Claudio Grossman, Building the World Community: Challenges to Legal Education and the WCL
Experience, 17 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 815, 818 (2002) (“A profoundly different approach is needed . . . The aim
. . . is to push the debate in that direction and explore ways to reconceptualize legal education in accordance
with the global transformations currently taking place.”); Stephen C. Hicks, Global Alternatives in Legal Educa-
tion for a Global Legal Profession, 3 Parallax: J. Int’l Perspectives 47 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=981421 (discussing the need for a more global law school experience to prepare students for a global
profession); Carl C. Monk, Working Together: Developing Cooperation in International Legal Education, 20 Penn
St. Int’l L. Rev. 23, 23–24 (2001) (discussing how and why the Association of American Law Schools put
together an international conference on global education).
52.  See Jon Mills, The Role of Law Schools in the Development of Inter-American Relations and the Rule of
Law, a Discussion by Law School Deans for the Americas, 13 Fla. J. Int’l L. 114, 114–15 (2000). Mills has cited
international exposure for faculty members as an important part of academia because:
When our faculty members go and teach somewhere else, they learn as well. They come back and
teach differently than they had taught before, because they are compelled to think differently when
they are teaching in another country. The benefit is not only to that faculty member but to his or her
vol. 5 no. 1 2010 69
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countries and that we encourage our students to do the same.53 To this end, I can
be proud of my small-but-globally-active institution. At The University of Tennes-
see College of Law, we cosponsor (as part of law school consortia) two study
abroad programs, one in England54 and one in Brazil.55 I have taught in the latter
program for the past three years. Although most students in my classroom in Rio
de Janeiro have been American law students, I have had the privilege of meeting
and working with Brazilian faculty, lawyers, and students (some of whom have
been full-time students in my course) each year. This past spring, I lectured and
taught undergraduate and graduate students at three universities—two in Rio de
Janeiro (Universidade do Estado de Rio de Janeiro and Ibmec) and one in Sa˜o
Paulo (Fundac¸ao Getulio Vargas—Direito GV). The students were hungry for an
American perspective on the financial crisis and cross-border transactions (and the
intersection of the two). The exchanges were lively and multidisciplinary. I learned
a lot by talking to these Brazilian students.
Of course, my students here in the United States also are curious about many
issues surrounding the financial crisis. They all want to know about Bernie Madoff
and other purveyors of recently publicized investment Ponzi schemes.56 How do
these schemes work, and why was the SEC not able to prevent them from existing
or expose them earlier?57 The students also want to understand why financial insti-
students as well. Among the other benefits of these programs would be the expanded exchange of
professors between Latin America and the United States.
Id.; see also European-American Consortium for Legal Education, Mission Statement, http://www.eacle.org/
?page_id=27 (last visited June 15, 2009) (“The EACLE partners are convinced that the future of legal education
will require greater integration between law faculties across borders, and more frequent exchanges of faculty
and students.”).
53.  See Louise Harmon & Eileen Kaufman, Innocents Abroad: Reflections on Summer Abroad Law Pro-
grams, 30 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 69, 151–56 (2007) (suggesting, among other things, that local law students be
incorporated into law school study abroad programs).
54. The University of Mississippi School of Law, Legal Centers & Programs: Cambridge, http://www.
law.olemiss.edu/programs/cambridge/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2009) (noting that the University of Mississippi
School of Law’s study abroad program is sponsored with The University of Tennessee College of Law).
55. Georgia State University Summer Legal and Policy Study in Rio de Janeiro, http://law.gsu.edu/rio/ (last
visited Sept. 10, 2009) (indicating that the Georgia State University’s study abroad program is cosponsored by
The University of Tennessee College of Law).
56. Cf. Samantha Gross, Financial Crisis Spurs Student Interest in Economics, USA Today, Nov. 24, 2008,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2008-11-24-economics-classes_N.htm. On my spring 2009 Securi-
ties Regulation exam, I used a portion of Bernie Madoff’s plea allocution as the fact pattern for a question. See
DealBook Blog, The Text of Madoff’s Plea Allocution (Mar. 12, 2009), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/
03/12/the-text-of-madoffs-plea-allocution/, for a copy of the plea allocution.
57. The recently released Executive Summary of the report of the SEC Inspector General catalogs and
characterizes the SEC’s many failures in the Madoff affair. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Office of Inspector
General, Investigation of Failure of the SEC to Uncover Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi Scheme: Execu-
tive Summary, (2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/secpostmadoffreforms/oig-509-exec-sum
mary.pdf; see also Diana B. Henriques, At Madoff Hearing, Lawyers Lay into SEC, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2009, at
B1 (stating that the SEC lacked a systematic way of dealing with whistle-blowers and the expertise to handle
major fraud cases); Allan Chernoff, Madoff Whistleblower Blasts SEC, CNNMoney, Feb. 4, 2009, http://money.
cnn.com//2009/02/04/news/newsmakers/madoff_whistleblower/index.htm (noting that the Ponzi scheme was
not discovered by the SEC as a result of internal rivalry and focus on other matters); Ken Prewitt & Tom Keene,
70 journal of business & technology law
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tutions regulated by (among others) the SEC do not have to disclose how they are
using federal bailout funds on a current basis.58 This question gets us into good
discussions about both the efficacy of the current periodic disclosure system in the
United States59 and the concept of materiality,60 both of which are foundational to
securities regulation in the United States.61 And students are curious about the U.S.
government’s emerging role as an investor in private enterprise.62 How does that
work, and what are the implications for securities regulation and corporate fi-
nance?63 And finally, my students want to know whether the global financial crisis
Madoff Failure Shows Oversight ‘Flawed,’ Levitt Says, Bloomberg.com, Dec. 17, 2008, http://bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=20670001&sid=ayaizPhDRBgY (describing the Ponzi scheme as one in which money from new
investors was used to pay off old investors). According to Norman Poser, this failure is part of a larger, more
systemic problem.
The fundamental reason for the failures, however, is the anti-regulatory climate, supported by aca-
demically generated anti-regulatory theory, that has pervaded government, including the SEC, in the
past two or three decades. The SEC’s main focus has changed from protecting investors to protecting
the companies and investment firms that the SEC was required to regulate.
Poser, supra note 29, at 38–39.
58. Cf. Lori Craig, Debating the Bailout, USC Law News & Events, Feb. 27, 2009, http://law.usc.edu/
news/article.cfm?newsID=3241 (demonstrating student sponsorship of a debate over the value of a federal
bank bailout). See generally Liz Moyer, Where’s All the TARP Money?, Forbes, Feb. 5, 2009, http://www.forbes.
com/2009/02/04/tarp-treasury-congress-business-beltway_0205_tarp.html (noting that, at the time, only 2 of
the 317 TARP recipients “were required to say what they would do with . . . the money”).
59. One scholar believes that “[o]ur system of disclosure has serious weaknesses . . . . Securities regulation
is motivated by the assumption that more information is better than less, but evidence shows that too much
disclosure can ultimately be counterproductive to the decision-making process of the individual investor.”
Ripken, supra note 39, at 146–47. See generally supra note 39 and accompanying text. R
60. See generally Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (defining materiality in the context of a
securities fraud claim under Rule 10b-5); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining
materiality in the context of proxy fraud under Rule 14a-9). In simplest terms, the SEC notes that “[m]ateriality
concerns the significance of an item to users of a registrant’s financial statements. A matter is ‘material’ if there
is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it important.” SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin
No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19, 1999).
61. See Ripken, supra note 39, at 145 (describing the approach to securities regulation being based on “the
long held belief in and preference for disclosure”); see also United States v. Anderson, 533 F.3d 623, 629 (8th
Cir. 2008) (emphasizing that to constitute insider trading, the information used must be material).
62. Cf. Fred Dingledy, Securities Fraud and Bank Bailouts, Oh My!, Wm. & Mary Wolf L. Libr. News,
http://law.wm.edu/library/news/securitiesfraud.php (last visited Sept. 11, 2009) (providing resources to stu-
dents to enable them to research recent developments in the financial world). A useful summary piece on the
government’s investment activities in private companies is Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 10. Additional infor- R
mation detailing how the U.S. began acting as an investor in the current economic crisis can be found in Josh
Zumbrun, Liz Moyer, and Brian Wingfield’s article, The Ownership Society, Forbes, Oct. 14, 2008, http://www.
forbes.com/2008/10/14/tarp-paulson-banking-biz-beltway-cx_lm_bw_1014tarp3.html, which notes that
“[u]nder the Capital Purchase Program, the Treasury will purchase senior preferred shares in banks. The shares
will pay a 5% dividend, and will rank senior in a firm’s capital structure to common stock. After five years, the
dividend will reset to 9%, if the bank has not repurchased them.”
63. See J.W. Verret, The U.S. Government as Control Shareholder of the Financial and Automotive Sector:
Implications and Analysis 3 (George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 09-13, 2009), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1348256 (noting that the government’s control complicates (1) federal securities class action
suits, (2) controlling shareholder fiduciary duties, and (3) insider trading laws). For example, the government’s
corporate investments have spawned interesting and unusual issues in resulting bankruptcy proceedings. See
Todd J. Zywicki, Editorial, Chrysler and the Rule of Law, Wall St. J., May 13, 2009, at A19 (“The Obama
administration’s behavior in the Chrysler bankruptcy is a profound challenge to the rule of law.”); Mark J. Roe
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is a sign that our existing system of securities regulation is irretrievably broken, and
if so, in what respects and why.64
Legal scholars are already playing out some of these themes in their own scholar-
ship and teaching.65 Some of these law scholars have worked in or with capital
markets, in financial regulation (as lawyers or business professionals), or in the
SEC, and most of them are translating that experience into pragmatic scholarship
and teaching in securities regulation and corporate finance.66 A number are looking
at global implications or solutions.67 A number are teaching courses that cover in-
& David A. Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy (U. of Penn. Law School, Public Law Research Paper No.
09-17, U. of Penn, Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 09-22, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion
Paper No. 645, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 09-42, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1426530; Tiffany Kary & Christopher Scinta, GM’s Main Street Bondholders Would Lose, Lawyer Says, Bloom-
berg.com, May 28, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601009&sid=AAVXocPtIYXO (noting
the claim that federal intervention in the Chrysler reorganization treated bondholders illegally); Zach Lowe,
GM and Chrysler: The End of Bankruptcy as We Know It?, Am. L. Daily, July 7, 2009, http://amlawdaily.typepad.
com/amlawdaily/2009/07/gm-chrysler-precedent.html (citing heavy government involvement as the reason that
recent expedited bankruptcies have diverted from traditional bankruptcy law); Supreme Court Asked to Block
Chrysler Sale to Fiat, FOX News, June 7, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/06/07/supreme-court-
asked-block-chrysler-sale-fiat/ (noting the constitutional challenge to the Treasury Department’s use of TARP
money to supply Chrysler bankruptcy financing). In addition, after the bailout, the government “overhauled”
the boards of directors of AIG and GM. See Martha Graybow, US Taxpayer to Get Say in GM Board Reshuffle,
Reuters, June 5, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/ousivMolt/idUSTRE5545DB20090605.
64. See generally U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Financial Regulation: A Framework for
Crafting and Assessing Proposals to Modernize the Outdated U.S. Financial Regulatory System
(2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09216.pdf (describing the limitations and gaps in the cur-
rent regulatory system and offering ways to evaluate the proposals to address these shortcomings). See also Kara
Scannell, The Madoff Fraud Case: SEC Moves to Fix Its Blind Spots, Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 2009, at C3 (describing
regulatory changes in response to the Bernie Madoff affair); Brain Baxter, S&C Masters of the Universe Weigh in
on Economy, Am. L. Daily, May 5, 2009, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/05/sc-on-the-
economy.html (quoting H. Rodgin Cohen saying that he is “far from convinced there was something inherently
wrong with the system” and “[t]he system will look more like what preceded the current environment than
many people seem to believe”); Nicole Gelinas, To Fix U.S. Finance, N.Y. Post, Oct. 16, 2008, http://www.
nypost.com/seven/10162008/postopinion/opedcolumnists/to_fix_us_finance_133818.htm (critiquing the finan-
cial industry bailout as a fix for problems in the U.S. financial regulatory system).
65. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 24–27, 30, 31, 34–39.
66. For example, Roberta S. Karmel, a former SEC Commissioner, is currently a member of the faculty at
Brooklyn Law School. Brooklyn Law School, Faculty Roberta S. Karmel, http://www.brooklaw.edu/faculty/
profile/?page=77 (last visited Sept. 12, 2009). For an example of her scholarship, see Karmel, supra note 25. As
another example, Donald C. Langevoort, a former Special Counsel in the SEC’s Office of General Counsel, is
now a member of the faculty at Georgetown University. Georgetown Law, Full Time Faculty Donald C.
Langevoort, http://law.georgetown.edu/faculty/facinfo/tab_faculty.cfm?Status=faculty&id=279 (last visited
Sept. 12, 2009). For an example of his scholarship, see Langevoort, supra note 16. Yet another example is Steven
L. Schwarcz who formerly represented banks and financial institutions worldwide and is currently a member of
the faculty at Duke University. Duke University, Faculty Steven L. Schwarcz, http://www.law.duke.edu/fac/
schwarcz (last visited Sept. 12, 2009). For examples of his scholarship, see Schwarcz, supra notes 11, 23, & 38.
67. See, e.g., Emilios Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis, Behavioural Finance and Financial Regulation:
In Search of a New Orthodoxy, 9 J. Corp. L. Stud. 23, 23–26 (2009) (describing the global implications of the
financial crisis and arguing that the lack of a global regulatory system amplified the effect); Langevoort, supra
note 16, at 192–93 (arguing that overregulation is a political reaction to the financial crisis that will damage
U.S. global competition); Pan, supra note 48, at 2 (describing the SEC’s embrace of European strategies for
regulation); Houman B. Shadab, Coming Together After the Crisis: The Global Convergence of Private Equity
and Hedge Funds, 29 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 603, 613 (2009) (arguing that convergence of private equity firms
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ternational business transactions and comparative regulatory systems.68 The impor-
tance of the continuation and expansion of these instructor-student interactions
and related efforts at globalization to both our system of securities regulation and
our world cannot be understated.
And so, it truly is the best of times and the worst of times. Each of us in the legal
academy has an opportunity for excellence that emanates from the current finan-
cial crisis. Each law scholar and teacher has an opportunity to inform students and
other law academics, as well as national and international policy makers, about
aspects of the financial crisis that intersect with his or her knowledge and re-
search.69 Each of us has the opportunity to connect, in an engaged manner, law
students and faculty in the United States and abroad to the law and legal systems
impacting and impacted by the financial crisis.70 Those teaching law in public law
and hedge funds will occur in emerging markets due to the investment around the globe in U.S. mortgage-
related securities).
68. Emilios Avgouleas teaches “International Financial Services Regulation” and “Corporations in Interna-
tional Business Law.”  University of Manchester School of Law, Dr. Emilios Avgouleas, http://www.law.
manchester.ac.uk/aboutus/staff/emilios_avgouleas/default.html (last visited June 18, 2009). Roberta S. Karmel
teaches “Corporations,” “Securities Regulation,” “European Union Law,” “International Securities Regulatory
Law Seminar,” and “Regulation of Financial Institutions And Markets Seminar” at Brooklyn Law School.
Brooklyn Law School, Faculty Roberta S. Karmel, http://www.brooklaw.edu/faculty/profile/?page=77 (last vis-
ited Sept. 12, 2009). Eric Pan teaches “Corporations,” “International Finance,” and “International Law.”  Benja-
min N. Cardozo School of Law, Profile Eric J. Pan, http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/MemberContentDisplay.aspx?
ccmd=contentDisplay&ucmd=UserDisplay&userid=10534 (last visited Sept. 12, 2009). These are but a few
examples.
69. Some consider it an obligation. E.g., Clark Byse, Walter Gellhorn: Administrative Law Scholar, Teacher,
Reformer, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 589, 594 (1996) (“[A] law teacher serves not only by devoted teaching and
research but also by personal concern for the individual human beings who are his students. A law teacher’s
responsibility extends beyond the boundaries of legal academe to the broader community.”). I am reminded at
this juncture of the wonderful article that Professor Mae Kuykendall wrote about Earnest Folk a few years ago,
in which she (among other things) eloquently articulated Folk’s impactful role as a scholar-drafter:
Ernest Folk provides one small possibility, for the professor to find a real place in producing the
small improvements some call the “genius of American law,” and one successful writer of big theory
calls “the extended order.”  The output would be a mixture of writings and participation. Achieving
the mixture of insight, credibility, and emotional elegance is not easy, and being recognized by ad-
ministrators and your peers is not easy. But it is an honorable calling. In the end you will be forgot-
ten, but so will everyone else (almost, anyway).
Mae Kuykendall, Reflections on a Corporate Law Draftsman: Ernest L. Folk’s Lessons for Writing and Judging
Corporate Law, 35 Rutgers L.J. 391, 480 (2004). This “mixture of writings and participation” can give more
meaning to the role of the law professor and the education of law students. Id. at 391, 480.
70. Law is, and lawyers are part of, an increasingly outward-facing and public profession. Michael Jordan,
Law Teachers and the Educational Continuum, 5 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 41, 48–51 (1996). The expansive role
that lawyers play in establishing and implementing national and international policy should and does impact
what we do as law professors. Id.; Donald J. Polden, Educating Law Students for Leadership Roles and Responsi-
bilities, 39 U. Tol. L. Rev. 353, 359 (2008) (“Law schools can and should be educating their students for the
leadership roles they will be playing in an increasingly complicated global profession because our communities
and societies need greater leadership manifested in business, government, public policy, and in the legal
profession.”).
It is . . . important to realize that law professors do more than teach students. . . . Thinking like a
lawyer, given the changing demands made upon the legal profession, means more than the ability to
analyze precedent and spot issues. It means addressing public concerns that may or may not be
subject to resolution in the legal system. Thinking in this context is not necessarily a cognitive process
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schools may bear a more concrete responsibility to take advantage of these oppor-
tunities.71  Regardless, efforts to capitalize on these opportunities are likely to influ-
ence the nature and extent of national and global regulatory reform and the
activities and expertise of the next generation of lawyers, policy makers, and law
teachers.
governed by certain logical rules, as much as it is the ability to facilitate informed public discussion of
issues that illuminate competing values, interests and choices.
This vision of the public profession places it outside of the traditional definition of a profession
which focused on mastery of specialized knowledge and providing limited services. Indeed, profes-
sionalism is normally associated with a reduction in the ability and desire to foster public debate and
searching inquiry into issues of interests to the general public. The alternative expanded public view
of the profession casts the lawyer in the role of public intellectual rather than professional. If this is
what is meant when reference is now made to the public professional and if the reference necessarily
implies certain ways of thinking, then we ought to ask whether this view of thinking and the profes-
sion is compatible with the setting in which future lawyers are being trained. Are law schools struc-
tured to produce public professional/intellectuals?
These questions go to the heart of what is, will or should be meant when law professors assert
that they are training students to think like lawyers . . . .
Jordan, supra, at 48–51 (footnotes omitted); see also Polden, supra, at 359. Meeting the challenges posed by
shifts in the roles that lawyers play in the world order will be a difficult, yet worthy, task for law schools and law
faculty in the coming years. See Jordan, supra, at 74.
The kind of education necessary to solve problems in this context is precisely the opposite of what is
supported by the ideology of the university law school. Instead of focusing on rule knowledge, the
starting point is realizing that lawyers, in their public capacity, will face complex and fluid social
situations. Their analysis of a social problem will not necessarily result in fixed answers or conclu-
sions. Analysis in this context is more analogous to insights which must be tested and revised based
upon changing perceptions of what the public desires and values or should desire and value. And, the
information acquired and conclusions reached during this process are subject to challenge and are
not always empirically verifiable.
Id.
71. See, e.g., Rex R. Perschbacher, The Public Responsibilities of a Public Law School, 31 U. Tol. L. Rev. 693,
695–97 (2000) (noting, among other things, an obligation on the part of public law schools to prepare students
for democratic leadership, engage legal education with public needs, and be publicly accountable).
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